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DISARMING	CHARISMA?		MAYORALTY,	GENDER	AND	POWER	
IN	MEDELLÍN,	COLOMBIA.		Kate	Maclean,		Department	of	Geography	Birkbeck,	University	of	London	Malet	Street,		London		WC1E	7HX	k.maclean@bbk.ac.uk			ABSTRACT	The	‘Urban	Century’	has	seen	a	rise	in	power	of	cities,	and	the	emergence	of	city	mayors	as	significant	political	actors	both	nationally	and	globally.	The	power	of	city	mayors,	which	unifies	pragmatic,	techno-managerial	leadership	with	the	authority	and	legitimacy	of	public	office,	invites	a	reappraisal	of	the	gendered	construction	of	power	in	the	‘Urban	Century’,	and	the	particular	notions	of	hegemonic	masculinity	that	city	mayors	recreate.	This	article	explores	the	example	of	Medellín,	Colombia,	whose	mayor	Sergio	Fajardo	is	widely	regarded	to	have	stewarded	the	city’s	rapid	reduction	in	violence.	Fajardo’s	leadership	can	be	characterised	as	typical	of	the	phenomenon	of	smart,	cosmopolitan,	charismatic	mayors	who	are	seen	to	respond	professionally	to	local	needs	by	making	smart	investment	decisions	and	attracting	international	capital.	The	emergence	of	a	techno-managerial	mayor	in	the	city	of	Medellín,	which	during	the	1990s	was	the	epicentre	of	Colombia’s	multi-faceted	conflict	with	the	highest	homicide	rate	in	the	world,	represents	a	fundamental	change	to	the	identity	and	gender	of	power	in	a	context	of	violent	conflict	where	legitimate	authority	in	terms	of	a	monopoly	on	the	use	of	force,	was	fiercely	disputed.	I	use	this	example	to	explore	how	mayoral	power	is	gendered	and	how	it	relates	to	violence,	which	is	central	to	liberal	theories	of	leadership	and	the	focus	of	the	feminist	critique	of	them.		The	possibility	that	such	a	character	attain	power	indicates	underlying	changes	in	the	gendered	nature	of	political	space,	
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including	the	institution	of	a	Sub-Secretariat	for	Women	and	formalisation	of	participation	in	political	process.			INTRODUCTION		Many	powerful	players	in	Colombian	politics	have	built	their	position	on	violence.		The	country’s	complicated	internal	conflict,	involving	an	exclusive,	reactionary	elite	with	a	tight	grip	on	the	limited	formal	power	that	exists,	guerrillas,	narco	cartels	and	paramilitaries,	produced	leaders	whose	authority	was	in	many	cases	defined	by	militaristic,	violent	machismo	(Cockburn	2010;	Viveros-Vigoya	2016).		Guerrilla,	paramilitary	and	formal	political	leaders	have	openly	perpetuated	a	hyper-masculine,	violent	image,	as	well	as	paternalist	symbols	of	command	and	authority.		Although	a	number	of	Colombian	Presidents	have	not	embodied	the	explicitly	vengeful,	violent	approach	of	President	Alvaro	Uribe,	whose	father	had	been	murdered	by	the	Fuerzas	
Armadas	Revolucionarias	de	Colombia	[FARC],	the	Colombian	presidential	office	is	marked	by	violence	–	whether	assassination	attempts,	corruption	scandals	or	collusion	with	paramilitaries.		From	the	alleged	psychosis	of	drug	lord	Pablo	Escobar,	to	the	‘firm	hand,	big	heart’	approach	of	Uribe,	it	would	seem	that,	as	Mao	Zedong	said,	political	power	–	be	it	formal	or	informal	-	in	Colombia	did	‘grow	out	of	the	barrel	of	a	gun’.			Unlike	the	presidency,	the	municipal	office	of	mayor	does	not	have	responsibility	for	defence,	and	does	not	have	the	theoretical	need	to	establish	a	monopoly	on	the	use	of	force.		In	the	1990s	a	number	of	‘maverick’	mayors	emerged	who	seemed	to	break	the	mould	of	political	power	in	Colombia.		Mathematician	and	former	Rector	of	the	National	University	of	Colombia,	Bogota,	Antanas	Mockus	–	a	self-confessed	‘geek’	with	a	penchant	for	the	spectacular	(Tognato,	2015)	–	donned	a	superhero	cape	and	adopted	an	eccentric	approach	to	political	campaigning	and	policy.		He	went	on	to	win	the	Bogota	
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mayoral	election	twice,	in	1995	and	2001,	and	his	innovative	policies	–	including	using	mime	artists	to	enforce	traffic	regulations	-	caught	the	public	imagination,	were	effective,	and	his	ludic,	pedagogic	approach	to	urban	governance	has	been	taken	up	and	adapted	around	the	world	(Berney	2011).		In	2003,	Medellín,	historically	Colombia’s	most	violent	city	by	far,	also	elected	an	academic	mayor	in	the	form	of	Sergio	Fajardo,	of	the	newly	formed	political	party	
Compromiso	Ciudadano.		He	had	a	PhD	in	maths,	and,	like	Mockus,	did	not	represent	either	of	Colombia’s	two	hegemonic	political	parties,	the	Liberals	or	the	Conservatives.		His	relaxed,	jeans-wearing	charisma,	as	well	as	his	creativity	and	technical	expertise	are	said	to	have	transformed	Medellín	to	the	extent	that	various	commentators	have	seen	him	as	a	‘hero’	of	development	(Peirce	2014;	Fajardo	and	Bateman,	2014).		Sergio	Fajardo	is	held	to	have	created	the	‘Medellín	Miracle’:	the	astonishing	reduction	of	violence	from	375	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	1991	to	39	per	100,000	in	2013,	that,	it	is	claimed,	is	a	result	of	the	progressive	policies	of	economic	and	urban	development,	known	collectively	as	‘social	urbanism’	(Brand	and	Davila,	2011;	Maclean	2015;	Uran	2010).				To	the	outside	world,	Fajardo	seems	to	fit	this	emerging	model	of	charismatic	mayors	who	are	able	to	transform	their	cities.		However,	within	Medellín,	the	‘Miracle’	and	Fajardo’s	role	within	it	remain	controversial.		Social	urbanism	has	been	dismissed	as	a	‘make-over’	(Hylton	2007),	which	merely	re-brands	the	city,	and,	more	perniciously,	as	a	‘paramilitary	peace’	an	epithet	which	refers	to	the	much	criticised	deals	struck	with	paramilitary	groups,	who	lack	political	status,	in	Disarmament,	Demobilisation	and	Reintegration	(DDR)	programmes	(Rozema	2008).		It	is	frequently	stated	by	those	who	are	supportive	and	were	even	involved	in	the	development	of	social	urbanism	that,	rather	than	Fajardo’s	leadership,	the	transformation	of	political	institutions,	social	
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discourse,	infrastructure	and	economy	of	Medellín	were	the	necessary	conditions	for	the	transformation	of	the	city	and	for	the	emergence	of	a	leader	like	Fajardo	(Maclean	2015).			It	is	not	only	in	Colombia	that	mayors	have	attained	political	prominence.		Due	to	the	urbanisation	of	global	population	and	capital,	and	the	consequent	rise	in	power	of	cities	vis	a	vis	nation	states,	urban	governance	and	leadership	has	become	a	distinctive	political	practice,	characterised	by	a	techno-managerial,	‘non-ideological’	approach.		From	Rudy	Giuliani	in	New	York	to	Klaus	Wowereit	in	Berlin,	city	mayors	have	been	lauded	as	the	new	rulers	in	a	21st	century	globalised	world;	rulers	that	can	best	respond	to	the	needs	of	their	city	and	allow	it	to	compete	internationally	for	investment,	mega-events	and	tourists	(Barber	2013).		However,	the	rise	of	mayors	also	corresponds	to	the	decline	in	importance	of	the	nation	state,	and	it	may	be	that,	far	from	implementing	a	technical	fix	to	local	issues,	mayors	are	forced	to	attract	transnational	capital	in	an	ever	more	competitive	global	market	place,	which	leads	to	pressure	to	reduce	the	tax	base,	to	the	accompanying	detriment	of	public	services	and	social	rights	(Curtis	2016;	Swyngedouw	2011).	However,	although	the	prominence	of	cities	as	hubs	of	techno-managerial	power	is	a	consistent	phenomenon	around	the	world,	these	policies	and	approaches	have	distinct	impacts,	not	only	in	terms	of	their	implementation,	but	also	in	terms	of	the	way	that	engagement	with	international	discourses,	scrutiny	and	institutions	of	governance	recreate	and	challenge	political	process	on	the	ground	(Dean	2009).				Whether	the	rise	of	city	mayors	is	seen	as	a	triumph	for	local	governance	or	as	a	post-political	resignation	to	the	power	of	global	capital,	the	power	that	mayors	wield	as	leaders	is	not	fully	accounted	for	by	feminist	theories	of	governance	which	have	focussed	on	the	nation	state	(e.g.	Arendt	1970;	Pateman	1988),	or	accounts	of	gendered	
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leadership	in	contexts	–	for	example	business	and	management	-		where	the	role	does	not	carry	with	it	the	political,	historical	or	cultural	power	of	public	office	(e.g.	Fotaki	2013).		There	is	work	on	‘women	mayors’,	that	ranges	from	studies	of	electoral	behaviour	(Ferreira	and	Gyourko	2014)	to	women’s	experiences	in	this	role	(Tremaine	2000),	but	a	critical,	gendered	analysis	of	the	construction	of	power	and	authority	at	the	city	scale	is	yet	to	be	developed.		Processes	of	power	have	changed	over	the	period	that	has	seen	the	emergence	of	significant	city	mayors,	and,	in	addition	to	the	structural	and	economic	developments	which	have	underpinned	this,	local	configurations	of	power,	violence	and	gender	has	transformed,	opening	up	space	for	different	tropes	of	gendered	leadership	at	city	level.				In	this	article	I	analyse	how	Sergio	Fajardo’s	ascension	to	and	exercise	of	power,	indicate	and	create	changes	in	the	gendered	construction	of	leadership	and	political	space,	and	changes	in	hegemonic	gendered	practice.		I	will	explore	the	gendered	construction	of	techno-managerial	leadership	and	related	changes	in	the	relationship	between	violence	and	power.		My	argument	builds	on	the	idea	that	both	leadership	and	violence	are	inherently	gendered,	and,	specifically,	definitive	of	hegemonic	masculinity	(Cockburn	2010;	Munck	2008),	in	liberal	political	systems	in	which	formal	political	leadership	is	defined	as	having	a	monopoly	on	the	use	of	force.		Urban	governance	and	the	authority	of	city	mayors,	in	unifying	pragmatic,	techno-managerial	leadership	with	the	authority	and	legitimacy	of	public	office,	invites	a	reappraisal	of	the	gendered	construction	of	power	in	the	‘Urban	Century’,	and	the	particular	notions	of	hegemonic	masculinity	that	city	mayors	recreate.			This	article	first	looks	at	how	the	concepts	of	violence,	power,	leadership	and	gender	have	been	constructed	and	create,	in	general	terms,	a	world	in	which	most	leaders	are	men	and	most	violence	is	perpetrated	by	men.		This	conceptual	debate	is	then	grounded	
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in	the	Colombian	context	with	a	discussion	of	leaders	from	all	sides	of	the	country’s	complex	violent	conflict.		I	then	discuss	whether	Fajardo’s	leadership	can	be	seen	as	representing	changes	in	hegemonic	masculinity	and	the	gendered	construction	of	political	space	–	the	institutions,	and	social	and	political	practices	that	frame	how	power	is	attained	and	exercised.		Gendered	values	that	construct	the	entwined	notions	of	violence,	masculinity	and	power	have	developed	into	a	trope	of	political	leadership	that	appears	to	have	challenged	the	militaristic	masculinities	that	have	historically	dominated	politics,	both	formal	and	informal,	in	Colombia.		In	particular,	the	growth	of	the	women’s	movement,	and	its	ability	to	develop	a	space	within	formal	mechanisms	of	power	over	this	period,	contested	the	masculine	construction	of	power.			This	article	is	based	on	interviews	and	focus	groups	conducted	over	two	field	visits	to	Medellín	in	2011	and	2012,	with	an	extended	period	of	fieldwork	in	July	and	August	of	2012.		The	fieldwork	period	in	2012	included	thirty	interviews	and	seven	focus	groups	held	with	leaders	from	the	city’s	political	and	business	elites,	social	movements	and	community	organisations	who	were	involved	in	the	political	changes	instigated	by	the	recognition	that	violence	was	at	crisis	point	in	1991.		It	also	included	visits	to	programmes	to	support	income	generation,	co-operatives	and	various	educational	and	cultural	projects	run	by	the	Mayoralty,	universities	and	businesses	there.	Documents	from	the	period	in	question,	including	reports	generated	by	investigations	into	the	violence	at	local,	national	and	international	level,	as	well	as	press	coverage,	were	also	analysed.			GENDER,	POWER	AND	LEADERSHIP		The	leaders	that	emerge	in	a	particular	political	setting	are	a	product	of	the	institutional	and	discursive	context	which	frames	how	power	is	obtained.	Contrary	to	the	idea,	
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underpinned	by	social	contract	theory,	that	violence	emerges	in	a	‘power	vacuum’,	if	the	way	for,	,	‘one	actor	within	a	social	relationship	[to]	be	in	a	position	to	carry	out	his	own	will	despite	resistance’	(Weber	1978:	53)	is	to	employ	violence,	then	violent	leaders	will	emerge.	A	context	in	which	aims	are	achieved	by	collaboration,	mediated	not	only	by	checks	and	balances,	but	the	values	and	norms	around	appropriate	behaviour	and	the	cultural	construction	of	power,	will	be	reflected	in	the	skills	and	approach	of	leaders.		However,	leaders	themselves	and	the	discourses	of	leadership	do	not	sit	outside	of	these	dynamics.		Leadership	is	performative	–	the	way	the	characteristics	of	those	who	have	power	are	portrayed,	can	alter	the	cultural	construction	of	power.		As	such,	the	micro	enactments	of	leadership	–	the	utterances,	body	language	etc	–	are	an	important	aspect	of	gaining	and	maintaining	power	and	influence	(Fotaki	2013).		
	The	discourse	of	a	leader	who	requires	a	monopoly	on	the	use	of	force,	with	its	roots	in	the	social	contract	tradition	(Houghton	2010),	itself	frames	the	values	and	characteristics	which	are	associated	with	leadership.	Liberal	theories	of	power	are	critiqued	for	their	individualistic,	masculine	bias	rooted	in	the	state	of	nature,	in	which	caring	roles,	co-operation	and	collaboration	are	erased	(Pateman	1988).		These	‘horizontal’	forms	of	power	-‘power	with’	rather	than	‘power	over’	(Houghton	2010)	-	have	hence	been	absent	from	analyses	of	the	causes	of	and	pre-conditions	for	violence	(Arendt	1970)	and	represent	a	theorisation	of	power	and	leadership	that	is	not	predicated	on	violence.	An	explicitly	violent	Leviathan	is	associated	specifically	with	the	pre-societal	state	of	nature,	but	the	‘strong	man’	trope	of	leadership	which	it	evokes	has	resonance	beyond	formal	political	office,,	and	remains	a	powerful	regulatory	fiction	entwined	with	hegemonic	masculinity.		The	cultural	coding	of	‘technical’	knowledge	and	expertise	as	masculine,	recreates	vertical	notions	of	power,	and	relies	on	placing	emotional	knowledge,	oral	cultures	and	traditional	knowledge	systems	into	alterity	
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(Nussbaum	2003).		This	maintains	the	vertical	relationship	of	power	and	control,	albeit	in	the	form	of	expertise	rather	than	strength.			The	values	that	leaders	are	thought	to	embody	are	defined	in	opposition	to	feminine	characteristics	of	care,	collaboration	and	emotion,	which	need	to	be	renounced	–	not	just	repressed	–	to	achieve	‘greatness’	(Bologh	2009).		The	notion	of	a	leader,	both	in	terms	of	legitimacy	and	charisma,	has	been	so	associated	with	masculinity,	that	women	in	leadership	roles	are	arguably	in	an	inherently	contradictory	position,	(Clare	2002).	These	gendered	binaries	are	found	in	Freud’s	work	on	the	masculine	‘heroic	ethic’	and	the	feminine	‘ethics	of	the	subjugated’.	He	argues	that	civilisation	itself	depends	on	the	renunciation	of	the	caring	leader,	and	that	men	must	strive	to	achieve	whilst	women	are	condemned	to	constantly	seek;	the	sociality	and	morality	that	define	civilisation	are	achieved	by	men	renunciating	their	‘natural’	aggression	towards	fathers,	sons	and	brothers	–	out	of	fear	of	a	patriarch	and	need	to	collaborate	with	other	men	(Bologh	2009).		In	this	formulation,	the	concepts	of	power,	violence	and	masculinity	are	co-constitutive.	As	Ehrenreich	states,	reflecting	Cockburn’s	(2010)	argument	that	gender	relations	are	causal	in	war	‘it	is	not	only	that	men	make	wars,	but	that	wars	make	men’	(cited	in	Munck	2008:	8).		The	inherent	masculinity	of	leadership,	and	leadership’s	inherent	association	with	force	and	the	threat	of	violence,	has	deep	roots,	politically	and	psycho-analytically.				The	subordination	of	femininity	is	a	defining	element	of	hegemonic	masculinity	(Connell	and	Messerschmidt,	2005;	Schippers	2007)	which	is	maintained	by	dominating	and	marginalising	other	masculinities	as	well	as	women.		Hegemonic	masculinity	is	the	gender	practice	which,	‘when	embodied	by	at	least	some	men	over	time	and	space,	legitimates	men’s	domination	over	women	as	a	social	group’	(Schippers	2007:	87).		The	coding	of	strength,	violence,	promiscuity,	reason,	logic	and	authority	as	masculine	traits,	
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and	the	institutions	which	presuppose	and	recreate	these	assumptions,	legitimate	men’s	power	over	women,	and	construct	the	tropes	of	masculinity	that	do	not	conform	to	these	ideals	as	inadequate,	and	feminine.		The	idea	of	hegemonic	masculinity	has	been	critiqued	on	the	grounds	that	it	assumes	monolithic	ideas	of	masculinity	which	remain	in	effect	predicated	on	violence,	and	fails	to	take	into	account	positive	masculine	traits,	geographical	variation	of	masculinities,	or	the	political,	social,	economical	and	cultural	context	of	how	masculinity	and	power	are	co-constructed	(Collier	and	Hall,	2000;	Kirby	and	Henry,	2012).		In	postulating	certain	patterns	of	gendered	behaviour	as	being	hierarchical	and	hegemonic,	the	discursive	contradictions,	and	the	fluidity	and	complex	patterns	of	behaviour	that	are	actually	adopted	by	individuals,	are	over-simplified	(Gutmann	and	Viveros	Vigoya	2005;	Schippers	2007).			Masculinity	and	femininity	exist	as	a	repertoire	of	behaviours,	which	pertains	of	contradictions	and	fluidities,	and	which,	in	being	performed,	recreates	the	gendered	structures	that	maintain	masculine	hegemony	and	the	subordination	and	marginalisation	of	women	and	‘other’	masculinities	(Butler	2011).				Gender	practice	is	hence	necessarily	relational	and	contextual,	and	hegemonic	masculinity	needs	to	be	understood	in	place,	where	the	construction	of	the	legitimation	of	masculine	authority	can	be	analysed	in	terms	of	the	complex	social	relations,	discourses	and	institutions	which	are	involved	in	recreating	gender	relations	in	context.		Liberal	analyses	of	power	and	governance	in	Colombia	are	predicated	on	both	the	‘strong	man’,	and	the	technocratic	forms	of	leadership.	Colombia	has	witnessed,	over	the	late	twentieth	century,	an	evolution	of	its	political	landscape,	which	reflects,	in	accordance	with	its	designation	as	a	‘consolidating	democracy’,	the	liberal	progression	from	violent	conflict	and	weak,	unextended	formal	institutions	of	government,	to	a	constitutional	democracy	(Bejarano	and	Leongómez	2002).		Liberal	analyses	of	Colombia’s	conflict	focus	on	the	absence	of	formal	powers,	and	these	analyses	are	
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influential	not	only	in	the	solutions	that	are	explicitly	indicated,	but	also	in	recreating	the	discourses	framing	how	formal	political	leaders	and	institutions	are	recognised.		The	argument	is	that	formal	institutions,	dominated	by	Colombia’s	divided	elite,	have	lacked	the	coherence,	capacity,	extension	and,	arguably,	will,	to	provide	security	to	its	citizens,	and	the	ability	to	suppress	para-state	actors,	such	as	the	FARC,	gaining	power	in	their	absence	by	providing	social	as	well	as	civil	security	(Denissen	2010).		However,	this	position	in	casting	the	situation	as	a	vacuum,	overlooks	state	institutions’	role	in	perpetuating	violence	(Justino	et	al	2013)	and	ignores	the	existing	power	dynamics	that	are	in	play,	including	gender	dynamics,	that	shape	who	can	acquire	power	and	how	it	is	exercised.				Parallel	to	liberal	analyses	that	see	a	monopoly	on	the	use	of	force	as	a	necessary	condition	for	legitimate	formal	power,	in	the	late-modern	era,	governance,	particularly	at	the	city-scale,	has	become	associated	with	technocratic	rule.		With	this	development,	the	characterisation	of	legitimate	power,	and	therefore	leadership,	is	bureaucratic	and	technocratic,	but	still	bears	the	characteristics	of	individualism,	verticality	and	dominance	that	have	their	roots	in	contract	theory	(Haughton	et	al	2013).		‘Good	governance’	is	defined	in	terms	of	rational	economic	policy,	and	violence	is	seen	as	a	criminal	matter	to	be	dealt	with	legally	rather	than	a	political	issue.		Even	in	violent	areas,	there	is	faith	among	the	international	community	that	market	development	is	a	key	factor	in	establishing	peace,	and	this	has	been	prominent	in	analyses	of	the	Medellín	Miracle	(e.g.	World	Bank	2015).	Such	forms	of	political	power	are	also	coded	masculine,	as	the	vertical	power	of	the	Leviathan	is	replaced	with	the	vertical	power	of	the	expert.	This	transition	potentially	represents	changing	hegemonic	gender	practice	with	regards	to	political	office,	that	reflects	changes	in	gendered	political	space,	agency	and	leadership.		
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POWER,	LEADERSHIP	AND	MASCULINITY	IN	COLOMBIA			A	survey	of	prominent	leaders	involved	in	Colombia’s	long-running	armed	conflict	indicates	various	configurations	of	gendered	practice	that	constitute	hegemonic	masculinity	and	reflect	the	country’s	complex	political	conflict,	colonial	history,	high	levels	of	inequality	and	highly	diverse	cultural	and	political	landscape.		Since	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century,	various	factions	have	been	involved	in	the	violent	conflict,	which	encompasses	the	long-standing	elite	feud	between	Conservatives	and	Liberals,	the	conflict	with	the	FARC	and	related	left-wing	guerrilla,	paramilitary	violence,	narco-cartels,	and	criminal	gangs.			Leaders	in	the	formal	political	arena	have	explicitly	drawn	on	paternalist	discourses	to	justify	their	power	and	authority.		Elite	leaders	in	Colombia	justify	their	exclusive	grip	on	formal	power	in	terms	of	the	need	for	stewardship.		Elite	networking	groups	–	known	as	roscas	–	and	the	domination	of	family	ties	in	politics	and	business	have	ensured	that	formal	political	power	remains	exclusive	territory.		The	‘National	Front’,	an	elite	power-sharing	agreement	that	held	between	1958	and	1974	in	which	liberals	and	conservatives	alternated	in	power,	maintained	stability	at	the	centre,	but	also	perpetuated	exclusion	and	minimised	participation,	perpetuating	key	underlying	causes	of	Colombia’s	conflicts.		At	city	level,	mayors	were	not	elected	by	popular	vote	until	1986,	before	which	time	they	were	appointed	(Davila	2009).		This	lack	of	citizen	participation	and	voice,	led	to	a	paternalist	style	of	top	down	government.		Formal	political	leaders	would	gain	support	by	establishing	vertical,	padrino	(godfather)	style,	clientelist	relationships	with	people	in	communities,	offering	individual	favours	in	return	for	votes	(Ceballos	Melguizo	and	Cronshaw	2001).	The	paternalism	of	formal,	Cartel	and	paramilitary	forces	also	took	the	form	of	exchange	of	investment	or	favours	for	support.		The	similarities	in	leadership	styles	between	formal	and	informal	powers,	
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and	collusion	between	them	–	an	example	being	Uribe’s	legalisation	of	paramilitary	activity	-	demonstrates	that	so-called	formal	powers	do	not	have	legitimacy	or	a	monopoly	on	the	use	of	force		(Ceballos	Melguizo	and	Cronshaw	2001).			Paramilitary	leaders,	like	formal	forces,	justify	violence	in	terms	of	the	need	to	provide	security,	and	they	were	established	to	protect	the	wealthy	elite	(Carroll	2011).		The	brothers	Carlos,	Fidel	and	Vicente	Castaño,	whose	father,	like	Uribe’s,	was	also	kidnapped	and	murdered	by	the	FARC,	led	a	number	of	paramilitary	organisations	in	Medellín,	including	the	conglomeration	of	paramilitary	groups,	the	Autodefensas	Unidas	
de	Colombia.		Their	use	of	discourses	of	the	‘strong-man’,	and	its	Spanish	equivalent	
caudillo,	to	justify	their	violence	and	power	is	perspicuous–	Fidel’s	nom	de	guerre	was	‘Rambo’.		In	contrast	to	guerrilla	groups,	the	number	of	women	participating	in	paramilitary	organisations	is	extremely	low,	with	many	groups	having	none	(Gutierrez-Sanin	2008),	and	paramilitary	groups	distinguish	themselves	and	justify	their	actions	on	the	grounds	of	‘promoting	masculine	values	of	courage	and	honour,	and	relying	on	retaliation	to	resolve	conflict’	(Romero	2000:	53).			The	leaders	of	the	Cartels	are	consistently	hyper-masculine	and	militaristic,	but,	in	particular	in	the	case	of	Pablo	Escobar,	they	disrupted,	violently	and	symbolically,	elite	spaces	of	rule	and	leadership	(Theidon	2009).	In	contrast	to	the	rhetoric	used	in	reference	to	paramilitary	organisations,	and	elites,	the	tone	of	autobiographical	accounts	that	have	emerged	from	members	of	the	Medellín	cartel	and	Pablo’s	inner	circle,	‘serve	to	pit	“manly”	thugs…against	what	emerges	as	a	“sissified”	elite.’	(Pobutsky	2013:	688).		Pablo	Escobar	was	from	a	family	of	modest	means,	and	was	one	of	a	number	of	drug-traffickers	in	Latin	America	who	were	able	to	gain	political	power	due	to	their	vast	wealth;	in	1982	he	was	elected	to	the	Colombian	Congress.		Escobar	was	seen	as	a	‘barbarian	…	crashing	through	the	gates	of	country	clubs	and	presidential	
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palaces,	to	the	horror	of	the	well-bred	few’	(Casas-Zamora	2010:	58).			Indeed,	in	one	tale	that	has	entered	into	the	folklore	of	Medellín,	Pablo,	at	the	height	of	his	wealth	was	turned	away	from	the	country	club	in	the	most	exclusive	neighbourhood	in	the	city,	as	one	cultural	worker	explained	to	me	in	interview,	‘because	of	bad	taste	rather	than	any	association	with	criminality’.	(Trades	Guilds	Representatives,	Focus	Group,	25th	July	2012)		Those	involved	in	the	debates	on	the	causes	of	violence	in	Medellín	in	the	early	1990s	emphasise	the	relevance	of	a	culture	of	masculinity	that	valued	a	competitive	individual	who	would	maximise	personal	gain	at	all	costs.		As	one	member	of	the	2012	Mayoral	administration	summarised	‘We,	the	Antioqueñans	have	a	problem,	and	it’s	that	we	do	not	have	an	associative	culture.		We	are	100%	individualists’	(Interview,	Member	of	Gaviria	Administration,	25th	July	2012).		The	competitive	underpinnings	of	this	individualism	can	be	summed	up	with	the	word	‘tumba’o’	[swagger],	as	one	woman	councillor	in	Medellin	summarised	to	me	in	interview:			 This	is	a	‘swagger’	[tumba’o]	culture.	Tumba’o	means	that	I’ve	toppled	you,	I	win,	I’m	the	most	important,	and	if	you	don’t	know	that	it	was	me	that	did	it,	even	better….He	is	the	man,	that’s	how	Pablo	worked.	That’s	how	he	got	what	he	got,	because	he	was	determined	to	beat	everyone	else.	Ese	es	el	
macho,	ese	es	Pablo	Escobar.	(Medellín	Councillor,	Interview,	16th	July	2012)		This	also	illustrates	the	value	accorded	to	the	characteristic	of	being	‘vivo’		-	a	vivacious,	sharp,	wily	character	who	would	have	the	wit	to	play	the	system	and	take	advantage	of	others’	naivety	(Ziederman	2016),	exemplified	by	the	axiom,	thought	to	be	said	by	mothers	to	their	sons,	‘get	money	son	–	get	it	honourably	–	and	if	you	can’t	get	it	honourably	get	it	anyway’.				
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	However,	‘vivo’,	competitive,	‘tumba’o’	culture	is	also	applied	to	formal	politics,	where,	the	pressure	‘to	be	the	man’	is	as	intense	as	in	excluded	communities.		Antioquia,	the	department	of	which	Medellín	is	the	capital,	is	known	for	being	the	most	industrial,	industrious,	entrepreneurial	and	competitive	region.		As	one	business	leader	proudly	confirmed,	‘we’ve	got	Antioquians	in	the	Sahara	renting	out	camels’	(Interview,	August	6th,	2012).		In	a	focus	group	discussion	at	a	Medellín	business	school,	the	challenges	which	this	presents	were	made	clear:		It’s	a	cultural	issue	in	which	both	the	entrepreneur	and	the	Paisa	[person	from	Antioquia]	are	very	untrusting	and	individualist	characters….	In	our	experience,	any	attempt	at	setting	up	associations	has	to	start	from	the	way	people	think,	and	from	their	social	culture.		(Focus	Group,	Business	School,	18th	July	2012)	
	The	potential	overlap	between	the	competitive,	individualist	Antioqueñan	business	leader	and	the	culture	of	criminality	is	often	noted.		In	the	words	of	one	sociologist	who	was	involved	in	developing	social	urbanism,	with	reference	to	the	competitive,	individualist	swagger	common	across	class	divides,		‘In	this	sense	elite	culture	as	well	as	the	culture	of	narco-traffic	were	both	typical	Antioquian	cultures.’	(Academic	and	NGO	Activist,	Interview,	August	7th	2012).				In	contrast,	work	on	the	experience	of	men	and	women	fighters	in	the	guerrilla	movement	has	found	that	class	consciousness	and	comradeship	opened	up	more	space	for	women	to	participate	and	challenge	traditional	notions	of	femininity	that	underpin	hegemonic	masculinity	(Dietrich	Ortega	2012).		There	are	a	significant	number	of	women	in	leftist	guerrilla	organisations	in	Colombia.	Although	figures	are	difficult	to	
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ascertain,	evidence	suggests	that	women	form	almost	30%	of	the	FARC	Secretariado	–	(leadership	units),	and	almost	20%	of	the	rank	and	file	(Gutierrez-Sanin	2008:	10).		Although	women	may	be	carrying	out	traditionally	feminine	roles,	for	example	care	and	administrative	work,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	ethos	of	solidarity	and	the	emphasis	on	merit	and	capability	has	allowed	women	to	challenge	stereotypical	ideas	of	their	abilities	and	create	new	ideals	of	femininity	(Herrera	and	Porch	2008).		Dietrich	Ortega	(2012)	describes	how	rural	women	were	held	in	esteem	by	their	male	counterparts	in	the	leftist	19th	of	April	movement	-		M19	–	because	of	their	superior	strength,	and	were	hence	able	to	take	on	valued	political	and	military	positions.		However,	the	‘masculine	culture’,	in	particular	with	regards	to	violence	and	sexual	morality,	continues	to	dominate	and	restrict	the	potential	for	the	development	of	non-hegemonic	gender	practice	(Herrera	and	Porch	2008).			Colombian	politics	shows	an	increasing	rate	of	women’s	participation	in	formal	politicals,	although	from	a	very	low	starting	point	(IPU	2016).	As	presidential	candidate	Aida	Avella	observed,	‘Colombia	is	a	country	which	has	always	been	handled	by	men,’	(Colombia	Reports	2014)	and	the	women	that	do	participate	tend	to	be	from	an	elite,	white	background,	reflecting	the	historical	development	of	formal	political	institutions	in	Colombia.		Nevertheless,	women’s	social	movements	and	grassroots,	community	organisations,	which	are	more	inclusive	in	terms	of	race	and	socio-economic	status,	have	had	a	prominent	role	in	Colombia’s	transition	to	democracy	and	peace,	and	the	inclusion	of	social	movements	in	democratic	decision	making	is	stated	in	the	constitution	of	1991	(Browitt	2001).		Women’s	organisations	have	campaigned	to	highlight	not	only	the	gendered	nature	of	the	country’s	armed	actors,	but	also	the	extremely	high	rates	of	violence	against	women	perpetrated	throughout	the	armed	conflict	in	Colombia	(Viveros-Vigoya	2016).		Masculine	authority	across	these	violent	groups	is	predicated	on	the	control	of	women,	and	this	is	part	of	a	broader	patriarchal	
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culture	which	women’s	groups	stress	is	part	of	the	same	violent	landscape	(Cockburn	2010).	As	one	feminist	politician	summarised:	‘What	we	have	here	is	a	situation	in	which	the	FARC,	the	military,	the	paramilitaries	and	the	Cartels	all	agree	that	abortion	is	immoral’	(informal	communication,	October	2011).					Women	and	women’s	organisations	were	initially	conspicuous	in	their	absence	from	the	most	recent	round	of	peace	talks	between	the	Colombian	government	and	the	FARC.		Nevertheless,	over	the	duration	of	the	talks,	women’s	participation	increased,	not	only	in	the	team	of	negotiators	themselves,	but	also	in	terms	of	the	groups	consulted,	reports	commissioned,	and	the	growing	recognition	that	gender	was	central	to	the	peace	talks	(Bouvier	2016).		Reports	on	transition	processes	in	Colombia	and	elsewhere	emphasise	that	post-conflict	transition	is	an	opportunity	to	renegotiate	gender	relations,	and	in	particular	change	hegemonic	practice	in	such	a	way	that	violence,	control,	dominance	and	retaliation	are	not	part	of	political	process,	or	the	everyday	(Bouvier	2016).		Transition	is	a	political	historical	moment	in	which	power	is	in	flux,	and	political,	discursive	space	can	open	up	in	the	mêlée	and	confluence	of	various,	hegemonic	and	non-hegemonic	gendered	practices,	for	progressive	masculinities	and	femininities	to	gain	power;	and	progressive	forces	in	terms	of	gendered	practice	have	always	been	present.		Whilst	the	men	who	gained	leadership	in	Colombia’s	main	warring	factions	maintained	power	by	adopting	patterns	of	behaviour	and	symbols	associated	with	violence	and	domination,	progressive	gender	practice	can	also	be	encountered	in	the	many	organisations	that	are	resistant	to	these	forces.		To	illustrate,	Hector	Abad,	whose	father,	a	human	rights	campaigner,	was	murdered	in	1987,	is	described	as,	referring	to	his	upbringing	with	five	sisters,	being	‘grateful	to	have	been	brought	up	without	machismo,	in	a	society	where	conflicts	are	often	solved	with	weapons….When	you’re	surrounded	by	women,	“you	understand	that	being	macho,	or	using	the	privilege	of	males,	is	ridiculous”’	(The	Daily	Beast	2012).	
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	In	the	face	of	all	the	other	factors	contributing	to	Colombia’s	violence,	the	long	running	conflicts,	availability	of	arms,	and	the	resources	to	sustain	the	different	factions	in	the	form	of	narco-money,	it	is	simplistic	to	ascribe	violence	to	cultural	factors.		Nevertheless,	as	Pécaut	argues,	it	is	possible	to	observe	a	culture	of	violence	in	Medellín;	a	situation	in	which	violence	had	entered	everyday	negotiations,	deliberations	and	actions	to	the	point	that	it	had	become,	in	Arendtian	terms,	banal	(Pécaut	1999).		To	illustrate,	one	feminist	activist	working	in	the	Sub-Secretariat	for	Women	remembers:		 I	saw	people	killed	in	my	area.		But	besides	the	personal	impact	which	is	caused	when	they	kill	someone	in	front	of	you,	[the	most	impactful]	was	the	attitude	of	the	children.		They	would	go	up	and	down	the	street	on	their	bikes,	pass	by	on	the	other	side	of	the	street	where	the	killing	had	taken	place	and	looked	on	with	curiosity.		I	always	asked	myself,	what	would	the	life	of	those	children	be	like	who	had	started	to	see	death	as	something	so	normal?	(NGO	Activist,	Interview,	August	2012)		FAJARDO,	LEADERSHIP	AND	MASCULINITY	In	this	section	I	look	at	how	Fajardo’s	leadership	relates	to	and	recreates	the	gendered	political,	institutional	and	discursive	changes	which	have	taken	place	in	Colombia	over	the	last	thirty	years.	Fajardo	led	the	party	Compromiso	Ciudadano	from	2000.		Although	outside	Colombia	he	is	seen	as	the	face	of	social	urbanism	and	the	‘hero’	of	the	city’s	development,	within	Medellín,	those	involved	in	the	city’s	development	stress	the	importance	of	contextualising	social	urbanism	and	Fajardo’s	mayorship	in	the	political	and	economic	changes	which	the	city	had	undergone	since	the	late	1980s.			Contrary	to	press	reports	that	describe	Fajardo	as	the	‘founder’	of	Compromiso	Ciudadano,	(e.g.	Peirce	2014;	New	York	Times	2007),	the	party	was	initially	a	civic	movement	that	grew	
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out	of	the	concerted	effort	in	Medellín	to	diagnose	the	causes	of	the	violence	and	propose	‘Future	Alternatives’	for	the	city.		The	formation	of	Working	Groups,	Seminars	and	Strategic	Plans	followed	the	appointment	of	a	Special	Presidential	Advisor	to	Medellín,	María	Emma	Mejía	in	1990,	and	significant	investment	in	the	city,	when	its	homicide	rate	was	almost	at	its	peak	(Maclean	2015).				Compromiso	took	the	decision	to	form	a	political	party	and	seek	a	leader	in	the	late	1990s.	They	approached	Sergio	Fajardo,	who	agreed	to	be	their	candidate	in	the	mayoral	elections	of	2000.		It	was	felt	that	Fajardo	had	the	cultural	capital	among	elites	to	be	accepted,	whilst	also	representing	a	change	in	approach.		As	one	woman	who	served	in	his	administration	summarised:	‘He’s	a	man	who	moves	among	the	elites,	but	who	is	also	capable	of	moving	from	below…He’s	an	academic	mathematician	who	had	never	been	political,	but	he	is	a	total	idealist.’	(Member	of	Fajardo	Administration,	Interview,	8th	August	2012).		She	however	went	on	to	emphasise	the	importance	of	the	political	context	in	understanding	Fajardo’s	leadership:	‘He	arrived	at	the	mayorship,	in	my	opinion,	as	a	result	of	the	previous	10	or	12	years.’		Structural	changes	–	most	notably	legislation	allowing	for	the	popular	election	of	mayors	(Acto	Legislativo	001)	in	1986,	and	the	new	constitution	in	1991	-	facilitated	the	development	of	civic	engagement	and	a	more	collaborative,	participatory	approach	to	politics.		A	civil	servant	responsible	for	participation	in	the	mayoralty,	summarised	it	thus:		 The	Constitution	of	91	breaks	with	two	things:	it	breaks	with	the	nature	of	political	participation	and	the	concept	of	power.		Before	91	participation	in	Colombia	was	subversive	and	was	generally	assigned	to	the	left,	to	being	a	guerrilla,	to	organisations	that	were	against	the	state.		But	then	in	1991,	
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participation	appears	in	the	constitution	as	a	right.	(Focus	Group,	Sub-Secretariat	for	Participation,	17th	July	2012)		When	Compromiso	Ciudadano	took	the	decision	to	change	from	a	civic	movement	to	a	political	party,	they	sought	out	a	leader	who	would	represent	these	values	and	unite	the	city’s	various	political	factions	in	order	to	make	their	agenda	politically	feasible.		Fajardo’s	style	of	governance	hence	reflects	and	recreates	the	city’s	changing	politics,	including	the	gendered	politics	of	how	leadership	is	established,	retained	and	perceived.			Techno-managerial	leadership		With	a	PhD	in	maths,	Fajardo	could	be	expected	to	exemplify	the	technocratic	leader,	and	the	managerial	approach	associated	with	the	office	of	mayor.		He	has	described	himself	as	‘the	candidate	without	a	political	ideology’	(El	Economista	2011),	and	under	his	administration,	data	gathering	and	transparency	were	foregrounded.		The	website	
Medellín	Como	Vamos	[How	We’re	Doing]	was	launched	in	2006,	with	the	aim	of	‘evaluating	the	changes	in	the	quality	of	life	in	Medellín’	by	collating	and	publishing	data	on	a	range	of	indicators,	including	poverty,	inequality,	violence,	environment	and	citizen	participation.	Two	members	of	Fajardo’s	cabinet	observed	how	Fajardo’s	use	of	data	challenged,	albeit	with	limited	success,	clientelist	and	populist	approaches	to	politics:			 Fajardo	did	not	negotiate.	Never.	He	had	the	figures,	he	didn’t	need	to.	If	people	objected	he	would	present	the	numbers	as	a	technical	issue	…The	majority	of	the	time	we’re	even	favouring	a	population	which	never	voted	for	us,	so	it’s	not	like	we’re	paying	them	back….	We	used	mathematical	models	to	locate	the	materials,	mathematical	models	of	population	density,	the	
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human	development	index,	the	transport	system.		(Member	of	Fajardo	Administration,	Interview	17th	July	2012)		Before,	the	resources	were	invested	where	the	votes	were.		With	Fajardo…	they	were	invested	where	there	was	poverty.		This	was	counter-intuitive,	because	that’s	not	where	Fajardo’s	votes	were	….		The	most	absurd	and	incredible	thing	is	that	in	the	following	election,	for	Alonso	[Fajardo’s	successor],	those	areas	where	there	had	been	the	biggest	investment	didn’t	vote	for	him,	because	the	politicking	still	dominated.		(Member	of	Fajardo	Administration,	Interview,	8th	August	2012)		The	emphasis	on	data	was	not	solely	the	result	of	the	mayor’s	preferred	approach.		The	1990s	saw	an	emphasis	on	monitoring,	evaluation	and	technocratic	‘good	governance’	in	the	development	agenda.		Specifically	in	Medellín,	the	1994	report	by	the	Monitor	organisation,	‘Competitive	Advantages	for	Medellín,’	advocated	replacing	the	exclusionary	political	economy	based	on	family	based	businesses	and	elite	social	networks	with	more	systematic,	modern	policies	in	order	to	attract	foreign	direct	investment.		The	report	observed	‘stagnant	and	reactionary	mind-sets	can	never	lead	the	firms	that	are	demanded	by	the	new	world	order.’	(Camara	de	Comercio	n.d.:	28).		Fajardo’s	leadership	came	at	a	time	when	business	elites	had	reason	to	support	changes	in	politics	and	leadership	in	the	city.		As	a	representative	of	Small	and	Medium	Sized	Enterprises	explained:		 We	have	gone	from	individualist	leadership	to	collective	leadership,	and	all	of	a	sudden	that	is	what	is	transforming	this	region.		Since	the	1990s	there	was	interest	in	promoting	new	forms	of	leadership,	and	there	was	a	push	for	this	from	big	business…	What	has	been	demonstrated	is	that	systems	of	
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paternalist	subsidy	are	reproducing	poverty	–	and	Medellín	has	a	lot	of	that	(Interview,	2nd	August	2012)		Nevertheless,	despite	the	trajectory	of	change,	the	question	of	persisting	poverty	and	clientelism	in	Medellín	is	a	source	of	continuing	debate,	and	indicates	on	the	one	hand	the	strength	of	technocratic	governance	in	addressing	elite	power,	and	on	the	other	its	weaknesses	in	that	it	can	further	exclude	communities	who	feel	that	their	realities	are	not	represented	in	the	discourse	of	technocratic	experts.		To	illustrate:		 When	the	city	of	Medellín,	from	Fajardo’s	administration	onwards,	started	to	push	proposals	of	social	economy	and	solidarity,	this	didn’t	work.		And	why	did	that	not	work?		Because	it	stayed	in	the	hands	of	supposed	experts	who	did	not	have	the	capacity	to	interpret	reality;	there	are	very	few	experts	in	the	social	and	economic	reality	of	the	communities.	(Focus	Group,	Community	Leaders,	July	24th	2012)		A	technocratic	approach	to	policy	development	and	implementation	has	been	criticised,	at	both	the	theoretical	level	and	the	practical	level,	for	imposing	a	form	of	governance	that	is	generally	associated	with	the	colonial,	masculine,	elite	in	the	Latin	American	context	(Taylor	2004;	Auyero	2000).			 Sergio	got	in	because	of	the	discourse	of	meritocracy.		And	in	a	meritocratic	society,	the	elite	always	win	–	and	why?		I’ve	got	a	masters	from	Cambridge,	and	you	went	to	the	University	of	the	Sticks.	(Cultural	Workers	Focus	Group,	30th	July	2012)		
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Policies	that	are	intended	to	be	inclusive	can	also	be	seen	as	an	imposition	from	an	exclusive	ruling	elite.		Fajardo’s	claim	to	have	no	political	ideology	recreates	this	false	neutrality.		Despite	the	compelling	need	to	include	marginalised	neighbourhoods,	the	library	named	after	its	sponsors	built	in	one	of	the	poorest,	most	marginalised	and	most	violent	neighbourhoods,	graphically	exemplifies	this	dynamic.	‘You	know	what	Fajardo	did?		He	built	a	spectacular	library	in	a	poor	neighbourhood.		You	know	what	he	called	it?		The	King	and	Queen	of	Spain	–	that	just	tells	you	everything.’	(Co-operatives	leader,	interview,	1st	August	2012).		One	member	of	the	2012	city	administration	who	had	been	a	political	activist	on	the	left	throughout	the	1990s,	lamented	the	lack	of	class	politics	that	has	accompanied	a	technocratic	approach	to	government			 I’m	still	surprised	not	to	find	any	traces	of	a	discourse	on	class	conflict.		There	is	no	longer	a	discourse	of	radicalism,	of	anti-business	from	the	working	classes.		Today,	the	discourse	is	about	collaboration	and	to	make	alliances	with	big	business	leaders.	(Member	of	Gaviria	Administration,	Interview	1st	August	2012)				Fajardo’s	technocratic	style	puts	a	neutral	gloss	on	these	interventions,	that	have	been	criticised	from	within	and	beyond	Medellin	for	being	focussed	on	the	priorities	of	international	capital	rather	than	the	needs	of	communities.		Reflecting	Hylton’s	thesis	that	Medellin	has	had	a	‘makeover’,	one	cultural	leader	described	the	libraries	as	‘silicon	implants,	but	if	you	see	the	city	from	the	inside,	there’s	a	different	reality.’	(Cultural	Workers	Focus	Group,	30th	July	2012).		However,	many	of	the	architects	involved,	either	directly	in	government	or	who	consulted	on	these	projects,	appreciate	what	was	achieved,	whilst	acknowledging	the	limitations:			
***DRAFT***Please see original and cite as Maclean, K. (2017). Disarming charisma? Mayoralty, 
gender and power in Medellín, Colombia. Political Geography, 59, 126-135. 
	 23	
The	library	parks	are	undoubtedly	an	important	project	from	the	cultural	point	of	you,	because	it’s	not	an	apologetic	vision	–	‘oh	aren’t	they	so	poor,	let’s	take	photos	of	how	they	live.’			But	nevertheless,	where	is	the	citizenship	in	these	projects?		Not	just	in	the	physical	spatial	intervention,	but	also	in	the	construction	of	a	social	fabric,	where	is	it?’	(University	Architecture	Department,	Focus	Group,	24th	July	2012)		Architects	and	urban	planners	emphasised	the	difference	between	the	architects	who	had	been	involved	in	developing	social	urbanism	and	the	iconic	projects	that	have	come	to	define	it,	and	a	more	participatory,	horizontal	approach.		This	was	identified	as	a	more	feminine	approach	to	urban	design.		‘A	participatory	approach	to	urban	design’,	stressed	one	architect	‘is	about	seeing	space	from	people’s	point	of	view,	adopting	their	categories	and	understanding	their	mobility	and	use	of	space’	(University	Architecture	Department,	Focus	Group,	24th	July	2012)		Technocratic	leadership	recreates	a	form	of	expertise	that	itself	is	coded	masculine,	and	relies	on	the	acquisition	of	cultural	capital	associated	with	elite	privilege.		Fajardo’s	technocratic	style	of	leadership	can	firstly	only	be	understood	in	the	context	of	changing	political	dynamics	–	including	global	capital	–	that	required	this	style.		The	technocratic	approach	represents	a	break	from	clientelist,	‘tumba’o’	framings	of	masculine	power.		To	have	academic	experts	in	government,	whose	policies	and	decisions	are	based	on	data,	represents	and	recreates	a	progressive	change	in	processes	of	power	that	were	imbued	with	violence	and	verticality.		Fajardo,	when	questioned	about	his	dealings	with	pre-existing	powers	in	Medellín	and	the	DDR	process,	insists	that	governing	with	expertise,	rational	explanation	and	a	strong	team	were	the	only	tools	needed	to	maintain	his	authority	(Conference,	15th	March	2017).		However,	his	strategy	of	negotiating	with	paramilitary	groups	has	been	much	criticised	for	integrating	armed	actors	in	such	a	way	
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that	continued	to	rely	on	them	to	provide	‘security’,	hence	creating	a	‘perverse	calm’	in	the	city	(Theidon	2007:	85).		This	would	suggest	that	the	expertise	that	Fajardo	foregrounds	in	his	political	discourse	is	not	in	fact	hegemonic;	his	authority	and	ability	to	govern	rests	on	negotiations	with	and	reliance	on	men	who	have	attained	and	exercise	their	power	via	violent	means.	Areas	which	have	been	particularly	praised	for	the	innovative	approach	to	regeneration	and	consequent	reduction	in	violence	in	Medellín,	were	areas	that	had	been	‘pacified’	by	the	national	military	under	Uribe’s	presidency	in	Operación	Mariscal	and	Operación	
Orion	in	2002.		Whilst	some	argue	that	this	was	the	moment	the	‘Colombian	government	reasserted	control	over	the	Medellín	neighbourhoods’	(Drummond	et	al	2012),	others	point	to	the	‘mass	killings,	displacement	and	forced	disappearance	of	130-300	people’	that	resulted	from	this	military/paramilitary	operation	(Bernal-Franco	and	Navas-Caputo	2013:	7).		Reflecting	a	number	of	comments,	one	prominent	business	leader	described	this	operation	as	‘necessary’	in	order	to	implement	the	technical	fixes.		Other	commentators	stress	the	continued	dominance	of	armed	groups	in	excluded	areas,	arguing	that	violence	has	reduced	because	they	have	taken	on	the	role	of	enforcing	security	(Hylton	2007).	In	this	sense	it	could	be	seen	that	the	office	of	mayor	is	offering	a	different	gendered	practice	of	leadership	but	without	challenging	the	underlying	notion	that	power	depends	on	violence.				Charisma		
“If	Sergio	Fajardo	Valderrama,	the	dashing,	denim-wearing	mayor	of	Medellín,	Colombia,	
does	not	come	across	as	an	average	politician,	that	is	because	he	is	not…	Mr	Fajardo	has	
brought	a	distinct	air	of	change	to	a	city	that	needed	it	desperately.”	(FDiIntelligence	
2007)	
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Fajardo	is	frequently	referred	to	as	‘charismatic,’	and,	in	many	ways,	he	fits	the	classical	formulation	of	the	‘charismatic’	leader.		He	emerged	in	the	context	of	a	recognised	crisis	in	the	city,	and	is	heralded	internationally	as	the	‘heroic’	leader	who	was	able	to	defeat	the	established	duopoly	of	political	parties,	and	implement	a	distinctive	vision	of	the	city	in	the	form	of	his	‘social	urbanism’	policies.		He	also	fits	the	quotidian	definition	of	‘charismatic’	in	that	he	was	renowned	as	an	excellent	communicator	who	can	engage	with	people	of	all	backgrounds.		The	image	that	Fajardo	portrays	speaks	to	a	globalised	political	stage	in	which	individualist	leadership	is	valued	–	and	the	construction	of	the	‘maverick	mayor’	in	US	work	on	the	subject	is	an	example	of	this	(Barber	2013).		Within	Medellín	itself,	the	collaborative	processes	involved	in	the	development	of	Compromiso	Ciudadano	are	widely	acknowledged,	but	Fajardo	nevertheless	represents	a	leadership	style	which	is	palatable	to	international	discourse.			Despite	the	headlines	implying	that	he	single-handedly	transformed	the	city,	Fajardo	himself,	and	the	people	who	worked	with	him,	emphasise	the	importance	of	the	movement	as	a	whole.		As	one	academic	who	had	been	involved	in	the	development	of	Compromiso	Ciudadano	summarised:			 ‘The	government	platform	on	which	he	arrived,	comprised	a	plurality	of	organisations.		The	strategic	and	political	direction	of	the	campaign	didn’t	emphasise	this,	but	the	political	programme	did.		The	novelty	of	the	government	of	Fajardo	and	of	Compromiso	Ciudadano	was	that	it	brought	together	all	of	this	which	had	accumulated	in	the	1990s….	But	initially	Compromiso	Ciudadano	was	much	more	collective,	the	second	Compromiso	turned	much	more	around	his	personality.’	(Academic	and	NGO	Activist,	Interview,	August	7th	2012)		
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However,	without	negating	the	importance	of	the	long-running	organisation	and	campaigns	which	underpinned	his	leadership,	Fajardo’s	personal	social	position	and	‘charisma’	marshalled	a	confluence	of	powers	and	created	a	political	space	in	which	the	policy	ideas	that	made	up	social	urbanism	could	be	implemented,	precisely	because	he	could	appeal	to	the	image	of	a	technocratic	leader	that	Medellín’s	elites	and	businesses	sought.		His	charisma	was	in	effect	a	reassertion	of	elite	masculinity	and	control,	albeit	a	recreation	of	classed	distinction	which	acknowledged	the	need	for	a	modernising,	cosmopolitan	face	to	the	world.				His	performance	of	leadership	indicates	and	recreates	a	change	in	gender	relations	vis	a	vis	ideas	of	political	command	and	leadership.		To	illustrate,	the	Medellín	based	newspaper	El	Colombiano	(2012)	covered	Fajardo’s	wedding	to	his	long-term	partner	with	the	headline	‘Sergio	Fajardo	and	Lucrecia	got	married	in	jeans’.		Fajardo	married	Lucrecia	Ramirez	in	the	exclusive	country	club	in	the	salubrious	neighbourhood	of	El	Poblado,	the	same	country	club	that	had	famously	denied	entry	to	Pablo	Escobar.		As	El	
Colombiano	goes	on	to	observe,	‘the	celebration	had	the	same	character	as	the	politician:	informal	and	fun’.		The	event	represents	an	evolution	away	from	the	elite	structures	which	so	defined	the	inner	political	and	business	circles	in	the	city	during	the	time	of	the	violence	–	the	‘roscas’,	or	elite	networks	that	underpin	formal	entrepreneurial	and	political	activity	in	the	country	-	and	a	reinforcement	of	them	in	a	new,	cosmopolitan	context.			This	also	represents	a	break	with	traditional	understandings	of	the	political	couple,	with	its	implications	of	masculine	‘headship’	and	a	supportive	wife.		The	‘political	wife’	has	been	theorised	variously	as	the	gendered	other	of	masculine	political	power,	an	empowering	fusion	of	personal	and	political,	or	as	the	most	trusted	political	ally	(Loizeau	2015).		Lucrecia	Ramirez,	refused	to	be	referred	to	as	a	‘First	Lady’,	insisting	on	
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the	title	‘First	Woman	of	Medellín’,	on	the	grounds	that	she	was	‘no-one’s	adornment’	(Semana	2006).		She	is	a	medical	psychiatrist,	professor	at	the	National	University	of	Antioquia,	and	a	feminist.	In	her	position	as	First	Woman	of	Medellín,	she	decided,	on	the	basis	of	consultations	with	women	who	had	formerly	had	the	role,	to	take	an	active	and	political	approach	to	setting	the	agenda.		She	built	on	the	work	of	the	Working	Group	for	Women,	one	of	several	working	groups	which	over	the	1990s	had	brought	together	representatives	from	NGOs,	community	groups,	academics	and	business	leaders	to	build	the	agenda	that	was	eventually	to	define	Compromiso	Ciudadano	and	Social	Urbanism.		From	2002,	she	brought	together	various	women’s	organisations	to	form	a	‘network	of	networks’,	and	played	a	key	role	in	establishing	the	Sub-Secretariat	for	Women	in	2002.				
	Sergio	Fajardo	and	Lucrecia	Ramirez	can	be	seen	as	an	example	of	the	‘coupledom’	that	became	a	norm	in	political	partnerships	over	the	1990s.		Starting	with	‘Billary’	(Bill	and	Hillary	Clinton),	the	image	of	the	couple	in	public	life	is	portrayed	more	as	a	partnership	than	the	traditional	man	and	wife.		This	formulation	of	the	‘ideal	relationship’	is	itself	criticised	as	assuming	middle/upper	class,	heterosexual	norms.		In	its	modern,	cosmopolitan	character,	this	form	of	relationship	fits	with	the	image	that	Medellín	wanted	to	present	to	the	world.		Nevertheless,	the	way	that	they	presented	their	marriage	to	the	public,	and	the	fact	that	Lucrecia	Ramirez	was	able	to	play	the	active,	feminist	political	role	that	she	did,	demonstrates	the	radical	developments	in	gendered	political	space	that	had	taken	place	over	the	1990s.						 I	at	least	think	that	Fajardo	has	a	strong	sensibility	on	women’s	issues,	something	that	is	not	usual	among	those	in	government.		Educating	girls,	giving	out	condoms	and	all	that	was	a	complete	scandal	in	Medellín.’	(Member	of	Fajardo	Administration,	Interview,	8th	August	2012)	
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		The	women’s	movement		
‘If	it	wasn’t	for	the	women’s	movement,	we’d	have	ended	up	with	the	same	machos	as	
before’	(NGO	Activist,	Interview,	15th	December	2012)		The	women’s	movement	in	Colombia	is	most	associated	with	the	peace	movement.		The	organisations	Ruta	Pacifica	de	la	Mujer,	Vamos	Mujer	and	Mujeres	que	Crean,	conduct	campaigns	against	violence,	the	importance	of	a	gendered	approach	to	the	causes	of	violence,	and	the	gendered	nature	and	impacts	of	the	violence.		These	organisations	highlight	that	women	have	been	the	greatest	number	of	those	displaced,	that	sexual	violence	in	the	conflict	is	prevalent	on	all	sides	and	that	there	are	various	factors	in	the	country’s	overall	development	strategy	that	increase	women’s	vulnerability	to	violence.			Members	of	Ruta	Pacifica	refer	to	feminism	and	pacifism	as	two	“political	bastions”	(Cockburn	2010:	142)	that	frame	their	approach	to	violence	as	a	continuum	of	gendered	domination	that	is	causal	in	war.		The	discursive	and	structural	context	of	formal	politics	in	the	1990s	was	conducive	to	this	analysis,	as	the	relationship	between	violence,	exclusion,	power	and	masculinity	were	explicitly	under	scrutiny.	There	is	a	distinction	between	‘autonomous’	and	‘political’	organisations;	the	former	are	active	in	creating	an	autonomous	space	that	is	independent	of	the	necessarily	oppressive	workings	of	the	State,	while	the	latter	are	prepared	to	work	with	formal	politicians	and	shape	the	formal	agenda.		The	fora	that	developed	over	the	1990s	included	organisations	that	were	erstwhile	resistant	to	working	with	the	state,	and	this	underlines	how	the	construction	of	mainstream	political	space	had	changed.				
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A	feminist	academic	who	was	central	to	the	development	of	the	Sub-Secretariat	for	women	concurs:	‘The	feminists	that	are	here	are	those	who	think	that	it	is	important	to	work	with	the	state.		To	gain	an	institutional	space	for	gender	and	not	only	that,	but	also	the	rule	of	law.’	(Academic	and	activist,	Interview,	31st	July	2012).		The	Constitution	of	1991	was	identified	as	a	crucial	element	in	changing	the	structures	of	formal	politics:		 Political	currents	other	than	the	traditional	political	parties	started	opening	up	–	this	was	facilitated	by	the	Constitution	of	1991,	in	which	they	started	to	propose	the	recognition	of	citizenship	on	the	basis	of	identity	–	women,	indigenous	etcetera	(Academic	and	activist,	Interview,	31st	July	2012)			These	processes	represented	a	shift	towards	a	collaborative,	inclusive	form	of	government,	and	reflected	the	trajectory	at	national	level	towards	consolidating	democratic	governance,	but	also	challenging	hegemonic	gendered	practice	in	political	office.				The	women’s	movement	had	a	prominent	role	in	Compromiso	Ciudadano,	and	with	the	establishment	of	the	Sub-Secretariat	for	Women,	became	part	of	formal	politics.			 Having	a	Sub-Secretary	of	Women	here	is	an	unprecedented	achievement	because	it	is	in	the	middle	of	a	supremely	conservative	society	with	some	parties	that	are	very	committed	to	traditional	thinking	about	women.	(Academic	and	activist,	Interview,	31st	July	2012)		Whilst	this	in	itself	represents	a	change	to	the	gender	of	formal	political	structures,	the	way	that	the	activities	of	the	Sub-Secretariat,	and	the	women	involved	in	it,	were	seen,	illustrates	how	a	gendered	binary	is	recreated	in	the	context	of	technocratic	municipal	
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governance.		Whilst	the	economic	and	infrastructural	development	projects	were	seen	as	being	at	city	scale,	the	projects,	such	as	educational	programmes	for	community	mothers,	community	crèches	and	co-operative	businesses,	run	by	the	Sub-Secretariat	for	women	were	seen	to	be	partial.				 They	don’t	understand	what	it’s	for	–	they	think	it’s	about	charity	for	women	–	they	cannot	understand	that	there	is	a	space	for	gender	inequality	within	the	theme	of	development.	(Academic	and	activist,	Interview,	31st	July	2012)		As	a	result,	the	sub-Secretariat	was	accused	of	behaving	‘like	an	NGO’,	rather	than	a	government.		This	was	in	reference	to	their	focus	on	for	example	specific	income	generation	projects	for	displaced	women,	that	involved	a	limited	number	of	beneficiaries,	and	long-term	training	and	support.		Such	projects	do	not	conform	to	the	expectations	of	impact,	and	do	not	produce	the	data,	that	satisfies	the	technocratic	government	which	mayors	represent,	whilst	infrastructural	interventions	are	seen	as	gender-neutral,	citywide	interventions,	despite	benefiting	specific	sections	of	the	population.				Whilst	acknowledging	the	changes	in	formal	political	spaces	and	leadership,	women	involved	in	government	in	Medellín	during	and	since	Fajardo’s	administration	are	very	clear	that,	despite	the	establishment	of	the	Sub-Secretariat	and	the	entry	of	more	women	into	formal	politics,	the	exclusion	of	women	still	underpinned	masculine	leadership	and	political	authority.			This	society	hates	women	in	power.		But	it	hates	them	in	such	a	terrible	way	that	any	woman	who	arrives	in	power,	or	who	has	an	attitude	of	empowerment,	is	badly	treated.		If	they	arrive	at	positions	of	power,	women	
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opt	for	mimicking	a	typically	masculine	leadership.	(Feminist	politician,	Interview,	31st	July	2012)		Even	if	they	are	new	or	different	men,	they	are	still	more	accustomed	to	a	more	masculine	and	brutal	environment,	as	politics	is.		I	think	that	for	many	women,	it’s	still	a	very	hostile	world…	our	leadership	is	very	masculine	and	macho,	and	I’ve	had	many	difficulties	because	our	men,	despite	the	fact	that	the	ones	in	the	cabinet	were	great,	that	they’re	my	friends	and	I	love	them	lots,	have	not	stopped	being	macho.	(Member	of	Fajardo	Administration,	Interview,	8th	August	2012)	
	CONCLUSION		Sergio	Fajardo’s	mayorship	in	Medellín,	which	exemplifies	the	pragmatic,	managerial,	locally	responsive	and	technocratic	city	leader	of	the	21st	century,	both	challenged	and	recreated	the	gendered	construction	of	political	power.		Within	the	city	itself,	Fajardo’s	image	as	leader	contrasted	starkly	with	previous	mayors,	including	Alvaro	Uribe,	who	used	the	force	of	the	state	to	quell	violence	in	marginalised	areas	of	the	city,	including	the	legalisation	of	paramilitary	activity.		However,	Fajardo’s	ability	to	adopt	this	technocratic,	non-violent	approach	is	to	an	extent	dependent	on	violent	intervention,	and	technocratic	expertise	recreates	the	vertical,	masculine	relationships	associated	with	‘strong	man’	leadership.		This	is	reflected	in	the	comments	of	women	politicians	from	the	era	who	emphasise	that,	although	the	women’s	movement	could	find	a	place	in	formal	power	structures	and	influence	the	agenda,	the	masculinist	construction	of	power	remains	and	they	have	to	deal	with	the	individual	slights	of	male	colleagues	and	the	trivialisation	of	their	work.			
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Nevertheless,	gendered	power	in	the	city	changed	over	the	period	in	which	Compromiso	Ciudadano	was	established	and	Sergio	Fajardo	became	mayor.	Collaborative,	consultative	and	participatory	forms	of	politics	underpinned	the	development	of	the	civic	movement	and	social	urbanism	agenda	that	eventually	led	to	Fajardo’s	success	as	mayor.		Whilst	a	collaborative,	participatory,	approach	to	governance	is	constructed	as	feminine	against	the	vertical	norm	of	patronage	and	a	monopoly	on	the	use	of	force,	there	are	complex,	fluid	and	ambivalent	dynamics	involved	in	challenging	and	recreating	this	gendered	binary.		Notably,	Fajardo’s	reconstruction	as	a	‘hero’	–	reflecting	the	individualistic,	masculine	norms	of	leadership	–	is	in	part	because	he	adopted	an	‘expert’	approach	which	involves	participation	and	collaboration	as	a	technique	of	governance.		Nevertheless,	in	the	context	of	Medellín,	this	represented	and	recreated	a	shift	in	the	processes	of	how	power	could	be	attained,	retained	and	exercised.		This	was	a	step	away	from	vertical,	clientelist	and	violent	political	processes,	and	opened	up	political	spaces	that	were,	explicitly	and	by	analogy,	more	feminine.		In	cultural	terms,	the	way	that	his	marriage	and	partnership	with	Lucrecia	Ramirez	was	portrayed	in	the	media,	and	the	way	that	Ramirez	used	the	role	of	‘First	Woman’,	represents	a	challenge	to	the	establishment	of	masculine	power	by	controlling	women,	albeit	one	that	recreates	modern,	cosmopolitan	values	that	are	related	to	class	privilege	in	the	international	context.			The	office	of	mayor		-	widely	praised	and	critiqued	for	being	a	pragmatic,	techno-managerial	role	–	is	a	form	of	leadership	that	recreates	the	vertical	power	relationships	of	the	Leviathan,	but	without	a	monopoly	on	the	use	of	force.		The	violent	context	of	Medellín	places	the	progressiveness	of	this	form	of	power	into	sharp	relief,	but	also	highlights	the	underlying	reliance	of	this	authority	on	force	–	in	the	case	of	Medellín,	military	and	paramilitary.		Whilst	techno-managerial	power	can	militate	against	the	‘strong	man’	leadership	of	clientelism	and	populism,	and	can	open	up	more	horizontal,	
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collaborative,	participatory	political	spaces,	theoretically	constructed	as	more	‘feminine’,	the	techno-managerial	mayor,	still	relies	on	placing	women	in	the	position	of	constitutive	other,	and	constructs	a	gender	focus	as	partial,	against	the	city-scale	‘neutrality’	of	urban	data.		However	the	example	of	Fajardo’s	leadership	in	Medellín	demonstrates	the	importance	of	seeing	power	not	in	abstract	terms,	or	solely	in	terms	of	a	focus	on	the	office	itself,	but	via	grounding	power	in	the	discursive	and	structural	processes	that	construct	political	space.		Fajardo’s	leadership	did	indicate,	perform	and	recreate	changes	in	the	gendered	construction	of	power,	and	the	complexities	of	this	emphasise	the	dynamics	and	diverse	nature	of	gender	and	power.		However	the	social	and	political	developments	which	facilitated	the	emergence	of	Medellín’s	techno-managerial	mayor,	belie	the	individualist	heroism	with	which	his	administration	is	seen.				Mayors	around	the	world	are	emphasising	their	scientific,	technical	or	managerial	backgrounds	in	election	campaigning,	and	participation	and	collaboration	are	themselves	part	of	the	techno-managerial	expertise	that	characterises	urban	governance.		Whilst	this	perpetuates	vertical,	top	down	leadership,	it	also	has	the	power	to	transform	the	gendered	construction	of	political	leadership	more	broadly,	and	open	up	spaces	in	which	masculinist	tropes	of	power	can	be	challenged.		However,	although	the	development	of	techno-managerial	leadership	in	response	to	the	needs	of	global	capital	can,	as	is	the	case	in	Medellin,	indicate	and	break	away	from	violent	political	processes,	this	is	not	necessarily	the	case.		Rodrigo	Duterte,	three-times	mayor	of	Davao	City	and	a	contemporary	of	Fajardo’s,	espoused	a	techno-managerial	approach	to	urban	development,	whilst	vocally	supported	paramilitary	‘death	squads’	(Breuil	and	Rozema	2009)			Nevertheless,	the	rise	in	the	power	of	cities	and	their	status	as	a	focal	point	of	‘good	governance’	and	global	capital	is	creating	political	space	in	which	power	can	emerge,	
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depending	on	historical,	socio-economic	and	cultural	context,	which	challenges	the	association	of	political	leadership	with	verticality	and	violence	of	classical	notions	of	power.		Theories	of	power	that	focus	on	leaders	and	their	‘impact’	on	their	surroundings	can	blind	analyses	to	the	changes	in	political	process	that	facilitated	and	supported	the	emergence	of	different	tropes	of	leadership.	The	implication	of	my	analysis	here	for	other	studies	of	urban	governance	is	the	importance	of	analysing	city	governance	as	process,	in	which	the	techno-managerial	policies	and	discourses	of	leadership	are	seen	not	as	‘post-political’,	but	as	converging	with	other	factors	–	including	the	relationship	between	gender,	violence	and	power	-	that	generate	political	space	and	frame	how	power	is	attained	and	maintained.		This	space	is	neither	necessarily	progressive	or	regressive,	but	can	be	strategised	to	challenge	notions	of	how	power	is	attained,	retained	and	exercised,	and	by	whom.			 	
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